While George W. Was Sleeping...

While George W. relaxed at the pig farm in Crawford today, pretending to write his RNC Convention speech and refusing to be bothered by the arrival of Max Cleland and Jim Rassman, John Kerry addressed the American public-at-large... and all three major cable news networks actually carry it live.

In case you missed it, Kerry's address today centered on the major themes of this campaign press release:

For Immediate Release
August 25, 2004

Administration’s Failures Set Conditions for Abuse

Failure of Leadership at Highest Levels: “The abuses were not just the failure of some individuals to follow known standards, and they are more than the failure of a few leaders to enforce proper discipline. There is both institutional and personal responsibility at higher levels.” (Schlesinger, pg. 5)

Failure of Planning: “Once it became clear in July 2003 there was a major insurgency growing in Iraq and the relatively benign environment projected for Iraq was not materializing, senior leaders should have adjusted the plan from what had been assumed to be a stability operation and a benign hand off of detention operations to the Iraqis.” (Schlesinger, pg. 47)

Failure of the Secretary of Defense: “Responsible leaders who could have set in motion the development of a more effective alternative course of action extend up the command chain (and staff), to include the …Office of the Secretary of Defense.” (Schlesinger, pg. 47)

A FAILURE TO SUPPORT AND TRAIN OUR TROOPS

“The military police were not trained … or equipped”: “In particular, the military police were not trained, organized, or equipped to meet the new challenges.” (Schlesinger, pg. 53)

“Mobilization and training inadequacies”: “Mobilization and training inadequacies for the MP units occurred during the various phases of employment, beginning with peacetime training, activation, arrival at the mobilization sight, deployment, arrival in theater and follow-on operations.” (Schlesinger, pg. 53)

Under-resourced and without cohesion. “Both MI and MP units were seriously under-resourced and lacked unit cohesion and mid-level leadership. The reserve MP units had lost senior noncommissioned officers and other personnel through rotations back to the U.S. as well as reassignments to other missions in the theater. (Schlesinger , pg. 74)

“Only a one-day training”: “The senior Army and Navy dog handlers indicated they had not previously worked in a prison environment and received only a one-day training session on scout and search for escaped Enemy Prisoners of War. The Navy handler stated that upon arrival at Abu Ghraib he had not received an orientation on what was expected from his canine unit nor what was authorized or not authorized.” (Schlesinger , pg. 76)

“Difficulty gaining access to … tactics, techniques, and procedures”: “…newly arrived units had difficulty gaining access to the necessary documentation on tactics, techniques, and procedures to train their personnel on the MP essential tasks of their mission. A prime example is that relevant Army manuals and publications were available on-line, but personnel did not have access to computers or the Internet.” (Schlesinger, pg. 55)

“Inexperienced and untrained personnel often yielded poor intelligence”: “At the fixed detention centers such as Abu Ghraib, lack of resources and shortage of more experienced senior interrogators impeded the production of actionable intelligence. Inexperienced and untrained personnel often yielded poor intelligence. Interpreters, particularly, were in short supply, contributing to the backlog of detainees to be interrogated.” (Schlesinger, pg. 67)

“Not trained … thinly stretched”: “The 372nd soldiers were not trained for prison guard duty and were thinly stretched in dealing with the large number of detainees. With little experience to fall back on, the company commander deferred to non commissioned officers who had civilian correctional backgrounds to work the night shift.” (Schlesinger, pg. 75)

Poor training and other factors led to abuse: “A cursory examination of situational variables present at Abu Ghraib indicates the risk for abusive treatment was considerable. …problematic conditions at Abu Ghraib…include such factors as poor training, under nearly daily attack, insufficient staffing, inadequate oversight, confused lines of authority, evolving and unclear policy, and a generally poor quality of life. The stresses of these conditions were certainly exacerbated by delayed troop rotations and by basic issues of safety and security.” (Schlesinger , Appendix G, pg. 7)

A lack of equipment caused casualties: “MP detention units will need to be equipped for combat. Lack of crew-served weapons, e.g., machine guns and mortars, to counter external attacks resulted in casualties to the detainee population as well as to friendly forces.” (Schlesinger, pg. 58)

FAILURE TO PLAN TO WIN THE PEACE SET CONDITIONS FOR ABUSE

No Clear Mission

No clear mission: “Leaders of inspected reserve units stated in interviews that they did not receive a clear mission statement prior to mobilization and were not notified of their mission until after deploying.” (Schlesinger, pg. 55)

Unprepared for Conditions at Hand

Department of Defense completely unprepared: “Military police and interrogators who had previous experience in the Balkans, Guantanamo and Afghanistan found themselves, along with increasing numbers of less-experienced troops, in the midst of detention operations in Iraq the likes of which the Department of Defense had not foreseen.” (Schlesinger, pg. 28)

Forgetting “Lessons Learned”: “The requirements for successful detainee operations following major combat operations were known by U.S. forces in Iraq. After Operations Enduring Freedom and earlier phases of Iraqi Freedom, several lessons learned were captured in official reviews and were available on-line to any authorized military user...However, there is no evidence that those responsible for planning and executing detainee operations, in the phase of the Iraq campaign following the major combat operations, availed themselves of these 'lessons learned' in a timely fashion.” (Schlesinger, pg. 30)

Personnel Shortages

Outnumbered: “The detainee population of approximately 7,000 out-manned the 92 MPs by approximately a 75:1 ratio.” (Schlesinger, pg. 60)

A shortfall of needed personnel at all levels: “A shortfall of properly trained human intelligence personnel to do tactical interrogation of detainees existed at all levels…No doctrine existed to cover segregation of detainees whose status differed or was unclear, nor was there guidance on timely release of detainees no longer deemed of intelligence interest.” (Schlesinger, pg. 63)

“Never fully resourced”: “We note that CJTF-7 Headquarters was never fully resourced to meet the size and complexity of its mission. At one point, CJTF-7 Headquarters had only 495 of the 1,400 personnel authorized. The command was burdened with additional complexities associated with its mission to support the Coalition Provisional Authority.” (Schlesinger, pg. 49)

A FAILURE TO REACT TO THE INSURGENCY

“Slow to recognize and adapt to the insurgency”: “In Iraq the U.S. commanders were slow to recognize and adapt to the insurgency that erupted in the summer of 2003.” (Schlesinger, pg. 28)

Blind to the need of more MPs: “The change in the character of the struggle signaled by the sudden spike in U.S. casualties in June, July and August 2003 should have prompted consideration of the need for additional MP assets.” (Schlesinger, pg. 48)

“More robust options should have been considered sooner”: “The fact that the detention operation mission for all of Iraq is now commanded by a 2-star general who reports directly to the operational commander, and that 1900 MPs, more appropriately equipped for combat, now perform the mission once assigned to a single under-strength, poorly trained, inadequately equipped, and weakly-led brigade, indicated more robust options should have been considered sooner.” (Schlesinger, pg. 51)

An outdated doctrine: “The doctrine of yesterday’s battlefield does not satisfy the requirements of today’s conflicts.” (Schlesinger, pg. 57)

A failure to search for alternatives: “There was ample evidence in both Joint and Army lessons learned that planning for detention operations for Iraq required alternatives to standard doctrinal approaches.” (Schlesinger, pg. 48)

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I hope George W. enjoyed his nap today. </sarcasm>